This article proposes a framework for establishing secure download for software-defined radio that follows the current recommendations of SDR-related organizations, and can be employed in a variety of SDR architectures. The main goals of the security system are verification of the declared identity of the source that produces the software to be downloaded, control and verification of integrity of the downloaded data, disabling of the ability to run unauthorized software on the software-defined terminal, and secrecy of the transmitted data to prevent problems such as loss of intellectual property contained in the software. The system includes the following parties: manufacturers of the terminal hardware and software; government authorities relevant for SDR and users of SDR terminals. The underlying ideas for system development include employment of four different cryptographic techniques and tamper-resistant hardware. The cryptographic techniques employed are a secret key encryption technique, a public key encryption technique, a technique for cryptographic hashing, and a technique for digital signature. An important feature of the system is that it provides the possibility to exchange cryptographic components in an automatic manner. The proposed system is flexible, highly secure to protect both users and manufacturers, and provides a framework for the secure commercial implementation of SDR.
INTRODUCTION
Software-defined radio (SDR) [1] [2] [3] [4] has been recognized as one of the most important new technologies for wireless communications. Secure software downloading is a key component of the overall SDR security issue. The main aim of this article is to propose a basic framework for the secure download of software as one of the key issues for developing the overall security architecture and functions supporting SDR.
Currently, any wireless device or system is required to obtain approval that it conforms to the regulations regarding frequency band, power output, modulation method, and so on from appropriate governmental authorities before being manufactured and sold as a commercial device. However, for an SDR terminal, since reprogrammable hardware is used, if the software is illegally modified after being submitted to the authorities, or indeed has never been approved, the use of that software may cause the wireless device to emit radiation illegally, which may cause interference to other users or even physical harm to the user of the wireless device.
Therefore, there must be a method of ensuring that the software downloaded is intact and has not been modified (verification of integrity), and has obtained government approval (authentification). Most likely it will also be preferable for the authorities to know how many of which types of software are presently being used.
Furthermore, in the event that some illegally modified software is created, there should be some mechanism to prevent the spread of the illegal software. A further necessity for the introduction of a software downloadable SDR system is that the software should be protected against theft by people or companies who would like to know the details of the software employed by a rival company.
Most research into SDR has concentrated on the physical devices needed to achieve SDR terminals and base stations, and the architecture needed to achieve this. Recently many prototypes of SDR systems have been implemented (e.g., [4] ). Although the significance of the security issue is recognized in a number of documents and articles, including [5, 6] , there has not been a precise proposal for solving the problems involved.
This article yields the framework of a system for the secure download of software for SDR terminals that takes into account the main aspects of the problem. Our aim is to propose on the system level, a complete basic framework for secure software downloading. We specify the system and show the relationships between all the parties relevant for the secure software downloading: government agencies, software and hardware manufacturers for the proposed system, as well as the users.
The presentation is organized as the following. First the background is summarized as well as the specific requirements for secure download of software for SDR and the motivation for our work. Next, the underlying ideas for developing a secure system for downloading are pointed out. Then a system concept for secure downloading of software is proposed together with an approach for changing the cryptographic components. Finally, the main conclusions are given.
BACKGROUND
The security issue has been recognized and pointed out as extremely important for SDR in a number of documents and articles [3, 5] . In this section we present some relevant illustrations of the current status of the security issue.
PRELIMINARIES
The security issue in SDR software downloading as well as in a number of data transactions includes the following four aspects [3] :
Privacy. No one can see the transferred content -implies employment of encryption techniques.
Integrity/Authenticity. No one can tamper with the content transferred -implies employment of cryptographic techniques for message integrity/authenticity control.
Authentication. Both parties in a transaction are really who they say there are -implies employment of techniques for the entities' authentication, which include simple password techniques as well as more sophisticated cryptographic techniques.
Nonrepudiation. A user or provider cannot deny their actions -implies employment of digital signature schemes and appropriate protocols.
FCC AND RELATED POINTS OF VIEW
The current status of the SDR security issue can be clearly seen from the recent document of the U.S. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) [6] , which states: • A means is necessary to ensure that software changes cannot be made to a radio that will cause it to operate with parameters outside of those that were approved in order to prevent interference to authorized radio services.
• Specific security or authenticity requirements at this time are not specified in order not to hinder the development of technology used to provide such security.
• Industry groups are still in the process of developing security standards, and the manufacturer must take steps to prevent unauthorized software changes to an SDR. The following has been recently pointed out: • The SDR Forum [5] has indicated that it is continuing to develop methods for the security and authentication of radio software.
• Further input from industry and other government agencies in order to determine whether more detailed security requirements are necessary will be considered. The FCC encourages all interested parties to submit relevant proposals within one year of adoption of [6] .
ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES
SSL-Based Security -Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [7] is a protocol for information security developed for Internet applications and is currently widely in use within the Internet. The protocol is composed of two layers. At the lower level, layered on top of a reliable transport protocol (TCP), is the so-called SSL Record Protocol. The SSL Record Protocol is used for encapsulation of various higher-level protocols. One such encapsulated protocol, the SSL Handshake Protocol, allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate on cryptographic components (e.g., encryption algorithm) and the cryptographic keys to be employed. SSL provides connection security with the following three basic properties:
• The identity of the peer can be authenticated using asymmetric (public key) cryptography (e.g., RSA, DSS).
• The connection is private: after the initial handshake establishes a common secret key, symmetric cryptography is used for data encryption (e.g., RC4).
• Message transport includes a message integrity check using a message authentication code (MAC) based on a cryptographic hash function (e.g., MD5, SHA). For more details regarding the mentioned cryptographic techniques see [8] .
A recent SDR prototype [9] uses over-the-air download over TCP/IP. Part of that prototype includes examination of the security considerations for software download. The significance of secure download has been recognized, and SSL is selected as a method for its support. Here we point out some items related to this approach: • It does not take into account certain differences between SDR secure download requests and conventional secure Internet download. • SSL has recently been shown to have some weaknesses if inappropriate cryptographic components are used [10] , as well as certain security problems related to a widely used encryption algorithm, RC4 [11] .
• Only an over-the-air system is considered; therefore, the download file cannot be stored on media and distributed in other forms.
• The system requires the use of TCP/IP in the terminal devices. other hand, the current status of WEP is such that it cannot be recommended for secure SDR download. It is more a warning of the necessity to provide complete and detailed consideration of all issues for secure software download. WEP is designed to provide privacy to packet-based networks by employing the RC4 stream cipher for encryption. Unfortunately, it has been reported in [12] that WEP does not achieve the desired goals, because of its insecurity caused by the employment of the small size of randomization data of only 24 bits. Recently, novel results that demonstrate additional problems with WEP were reported in [11] . It is shown that RC4 is insecure in a common mode of operation used in WEP where a fixed secret key is concatenated with known initial value modifiers in order to encrypt different messages. The attacking method proposed in [11] is practical for any secret key size and any modifier size, including the 24 bits recommended in original WEP and the 128 bits recommended in the revised version, WEP2. The attack developed is based on certain weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm and identification of a large number of weak keys.
WEP-Based Security
Dedicated SDR Proposals -One of the most direct attempts toward a precise specification of the security required for SDR is given in [13] .
The following issues are pointed out, but without precise specifications:
• Encryption of download channel, hardware key, and terminal ID are countermeasures against illegal copying of the downloaded program.
• Certification is a countermeasure against alteration of the downloaded program. Accordingly, [13] mentioned many relevant issues but did not make a detailed proposal to specify the complete system for secure downloading. General guidelines for SDR secure software download are given in [3] , but also without a precise specification even of the main relevant issues. Some security issues dedicated to SDR are discussed in [14] as well, but without a desirable overall consideration.
SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE SDR DOWNLOADING AND MOTIVATION FOR THIS WORK SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
In order to ensure that a malicious user cannot download illegal software and cannot illegally redistribute downloaded software, we need certain requirements specific to secure SDR download to be fulfilled. We can identify the following differences between secure SDR download and conventional Internet downloading.
Restrictions on Downloadable Software. It should only be possible for approved software to be downloaded to the SDR terminal. This requirement does not exist in secure Internet download.
Parties Involved in the Secure Downloading System. A mandatory party in a secure downloading system for SDR will be the software approval authority. Usual secure downloading does not require the involvement of an approval authority.
User Inaccessibility to the Security System. One of the most interesting differences between a system for SDR secure downloading and a system for secure downloading via the Internet is that in the SDR case a user should not have any control over the security system. Particularly, an SDR terminal user should not have any influence on the selection of the cryptographic techniques and keys involved. Note that this requirement will not have any impact on a legal user. Actually this means that a user does not have to worry about any of the security issues; in other words, they should be transparent from the user's point of view. Appropriate measures should be included to prevent any access of the user to the security system. One method of enforcing this rule is employment of tamper-resistant hardware.
MOTIVATION FOR OUR WORK
The specific requirements outlined above directly imply that SSL in its standard form is not suitable for secure SDR download. Particularly, as an illustration, note that SSL employs a MAC for data authentication. This MAC provides security against third parties but assumes mutual trust between the sender and receiver since both parties share the same MAC secret key. This implies that if SSL is used, the user's terminal should have the secret key for MAC control, which opens a door for a malicious user to attempt to download illegal software. Accordingly, a MAC does not protect against a malicious receiver. On the other hand, digital signature techniques do not require mutual trust, because the key for producing the digital signature resides with only one party. The discussion of WEP also implies that the current version cannot be recommended for SDR purposes. Furthermore, all the elements previously discussed, including SDR dedicated approaches, show that until now there has not been an appropriate initial proposal for the SDR secure downloading issue, even though it is one of the most pressing for the introduction of SDR.
The given illustrations of the current status indicate that specification of solutions for software downloading in SDR is an important and open problem. The main aim of this article is to present a proposal of an appropriate system framework for secure software download.
UNDERLYING IDEAS FOR DEVELOPING A SECURE DOWNLOAD FRAMEWORK
In order to improve on previously reported results related to secure download and to obtain an appropriate high level of security, a method of secure downloading has been developed based on the following underlying ideas.
SYSTEM GOALS AND INVOLVED PARTIES
The main goals of the proposed security system are the following:
Enforcing the following security requirements: • Verification of the declared identity of the source that produces the software to be downloaded • Control and verification of integrity of the downloaded software • Negating the ability to run unauthorized software on an SDR terminal • Secrecy of the transmitted data to prevent the loss of intellectual property in the software itself The ability to exchange the cryptographic components employed
Inclusion of the ability to exchange the cryptographic components is a very important feature because for currently available efficient cryptographic primitives, security cannot be proven in a definitive manner. Also, this ability gives flexibility for secure download of software from different software suppliers, by inclusion of additional private keys other than those initially specified at manufacture.
Note that for simplicity of presentation we intentionally do not consider the nonrepudiation security requirement because it is mainly related not to core security but to the SDR billing issue. The proposed system can easily be extended to include this issue as well.
The system includes the following parties: Let D denote the software or data to be processed by certain cryptographic techniques. Then the cryptographic techniques above can be roughly specified as follows:
• A secret key (symmetric) encryption system usually employs the same cryptographic key K which should be kept secret for encryption and decryption so that the following is valid:
, where E K (⋅) and E -1 K (⋅) denote the encryption and decryption transformations controlled by the secret key K, respectively, and S denotes enciphered data D.
Note that E K (⋅) and E -1 K (⋅) also assume employment of certain random but public randomization parameters if it is required by that particular encryption technique (e.g., stream ciphers).
• A public key (asymmetric) encryption system is based on two corresponding cryptographic keys, the public key PK for enciphering and the secret key SK for deciphering, and the following is valid:
• D) , assuming that the mapping hash(⋅) fulfills certain requirements and that the hash value H can be considered a fingerprint of the corresponding D.
• In our construction we employ the digital signature DS of the considered data D defined as the following: DS = E -1
SK (H), H = hash(D).
For the technical details related to the above cryptographic techniques the interested reader should consult references such as [8] .
Symmetric key encryption is used to prevent problems related to possible wiretapping of downloaded data and to prevent the spread of illegal software even if the private government key is compromised. Public key encryption, cryptographic hashing, and digital signature techniques are employed to provide integrity control of the downloading data, as well as to prove the authenticity of the information source.
DESIGN OF A SECURE DOWNLOAD SYSTEM
Following relevant recommendations ( [5, 6] ) and the underlying ideas given in the previous section, this section specifies a framework for developing secure SDR download.
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
The secure downloading system is based on certain collections of cryptographic primitives (for hashing, digital signature, and ciphering) and keys. During downloading, only one component selected from each of the collections is employed.
In the proposed system a unique collection of secret keys is assigned for the purpose of symmetric encryption to each wireless terminal. Tamper-resistant hardware is employed to provide secure storage for the terminal secret keys to be used for decrypting of the symmetric key encrypted data. It has been reported that software implementation of security functions offers only limited physical security, particularly with respect to key storage. Each terminal also contains a collection of public keys of the verification or approval authority (usually the government) for the data to be downloaded.
The tamperproof hardware module contains the security logic, reconfigurable hardwaresuch as a field programmable gate array (FPGA), digital signal processor (DSP), or some combination -other memory and hardware as determined by the manufacturer, and the keys currently in use. From the security point of view, we assume that anything within this module cannot be physically modified without destroying the hardware itself. The model of this security module is shown in Fig. 1 . Also, note that the tamperproof hardware module is a single but reconfigurable unit, and that it can include the ability to remotely disable a terminal.
We note that the proposed system is an end-toend encryption system, that is, the data is encrypted at (or very close to) the source and decrypted at the wireless terminal rather than at a wireless security system. Current wireless security proposals are based on wireless communications standards. That is, the security is employed by the wireless provider alone, only for the over-the-air link. This has two drawbacks. First, the attacker could try and steal the software before being transmitted to the user and secondly and more importantly, all users and terminals must use the same security measures. Where a security weakness exists, the standards must be revised, as has been shown with security in WEP or Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), for example. Furthermore, the wireless link will not be the only method of downloading software: Internet and in-store (wired) as well as distribution by physical media (e.g., memory stick) should be considered. Our proposal does not depend on the physical method used for distribution of the software.
SDRs will encompass several wireless standards. Therefore, a security framework is required that is independent of any particular wireless standard. The proposed system is independent of any wireless security methods employed. In fact, for over-the-air download, wireless encryption and authentification by the wireless service provider may indeed take place; however, this alone does not meet the needs of a secure download system.
DIGITAL SIGNATURE FOR AUTHENTIFICATION OF ORIGIN AND VERIFICATION OF INTEGRITY
The generation of the digital signature is shown in Fig. 2 . First, the software or program file and the appropriate hardware is submitted to the authorities for testing, or, as is currently the case, test results are submitted and approved. Once the combination of software and hardware has been approved, the fingerprint or hash H of the software will be signed using the approval authority's secret key SK. No one apart from the appropriate agency has access to or knowledge of this secret key. The digital signature DS generated is unique for a particular piece of software D due to the nature of the hash function hash, and now if the terminal manufacturer changes the software, they must reapply to have the software validated again. The digital signature consists of a hash and an encryption function. Even if the hash function is well known, the encryption of the hash result by the approval authority's secret key SK makes it extremely difficult to forge the DS for that piece of software.
The software program file is now signed as being legitimate (i.e., approved) software. However, the program file is still able to be read and is not encrypted.
ENCRYPTION TO A PARTICULAR TERMINAL
The encryption of the file is done using a secret key K, which is unique to each terminal. One copy of the key is stored in the tamperproof hardware on the terminal; the other is stored in the terminal manufacturers database. The generation of the encrypted and signed file S is shown in Fig. 3 .
The signed file is encrypted by a secret key that is valid only for a single terminal. That is, only that terminal has knowledge of the secret key. The secret key is stored in tamperproof hardware on the terminal device. Since symmetric encryption techniques are used, encryption and decryption is fast. This is an advantage for real-time encryption and also for speedy decryption of the encrypted file. Using an appropriate symmetric cipher, savings in battery consumption can also be expected.
In the unlikely event that a secret key is stolen, the attacker still cannot generate legitimate software since they cannot correctly digitally sign any software without the government's secret key.
Even if the government secret key was also stolen, the worst case is the generation of illegal software for at most one terminal. Incorrect or otherwise modified software cannot be distributed to every terminal without knowledge of each terminals' individual secret key. The distribution of the initial keys set is accomplished at the time of manufacture, and if necessary, certain elements of this set can be updated via secure download, explained in a later section.
OPERATION AT THE SOFTWARE-DEFINED RADIO TERMINAL
The decryption and verification of the downloaded software is shown in Fig. 4 .
First the encrypted file is decrypted using the terminal secret key K. Next, the digital signature is checked using the approval authorities' public key PK, available to all terminals. Using the hash function the decrypted file hash or fingerprint is calculated, and if the two match, the software is legitimate and has not been modified since approved.
Therefore, based on this verification of integrity and authentication, the file should be downloaded into the reconfigurable logic, such as an FPGA. If the fingerprints do not match, the software has been modified or is not signed and approved by the government, and is not loaded into the terminal hardware, with the appropriate error messages displayed to the user. Figure 5 displays the proposed relationships between the hardware (terminal) manufacturer, software creator, government authorizing agency, wireless service provider, and user.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE PROPOSED DOWNLOAD SYSTEM
The security algorithms used in the proposed system will be designed and implemented by the terminal manufacturer, and may be secret and proprietary. However, they may be open and examined by third parties to verify their strength against many different cryptographic attacks.
The database of users' secret keys is stored at each manufacturer. The encryption is performed at the manufacturer, which means that unique keys are not required for each software creator.
If the current practices continue, trusted manufacturers may be allowed to submit data showing that their equipment and software meet regulatory specifications, and the software may not need to be submitted to regulatory bodies for review. One copy of the software should be signed by or on behalf of the regulatory authorities.
This scheme does not cover encryption and authentication between the software creator, manufacturer, and government. Strict agreements between these parties will be necessary. The manufacturer and software creator will often be the same company, since terminal manufacturing companies will want to write software that takes advantage of particular hardware features of their own terminal.
I Figure 3 . Generation of an encrypted program file to a specific terminal by the handset manufacturer using the stored secret key of that particular terminal. Wireless service providers will also be part of the system, but they do not play an active part in the proposed scheme. Therefore, this scheme operates independent of any wireless encryption techniques, modulation methods, frequency bands, and so on that may be used and specified by the wireless provider.
ELECTRONIC LABELING
In [6] the use of electronic labeling is permitted to show the authorization to the user in a graphical manner such as via a LCD display.
In this system, we propose that the electronic label simply be based on the output of E PK (DS) which in the case of approved software is also identical to hash(D). For example, the popular hashing algorithm MD5 produces a string of 128 bits which is often represented as a string of 32 four-bit characters (e.g., 3dae13c00e6d3711a5a6f2f117a25d61) and output to the display.
AN APPROACH FOR EXCHANGEABILITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS
Recall that the proposed system for secure downloading employs three cryptographic primitives -a hash function, a digital signature, and symmetric key ciphering -as well as a secret key and a public key during each downloading procedure, and that the proposal includes the possibility to exchange any of the cryptographic components employed.
Inclusion of this possibility was motivated by the reality that the security evaluation of currently available efficient cryptographic techniques can point out weaknesses but cannot yield a definitive proof of security. In other words, if the current security evaluation cannot identify any weakness of a cryptographic primitive, this does not guarantee that the cryptographic primitive is secure and cannot be broken by some cryptanalysis techniques developed later. An illustrative example is the situation with the A5 cipher for GSM. After a number of years and widespread use of the system, certain serious weaknesses and the ability to break the cipher have been reported [15] . Security evaluation of cryptographic primitives is recognized as a very important issue, and it is the main topic of a number of international projects including New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE) [16] (for illustration of particular evaluation methods and results see, e.g., [17] [18] [19] [20] ). Results of this and related projects are a strong indication for including in the system a possibility for changeability of the cryptographic components.
In order to minimize the negative effects of a possible situation where a manufacturer has initially employed a cryptographic primitive that appears to be undesirably weak, this proposal for a system for secure download includes the possibility to exchange any current cryptographic primitive or key with a new one automatically. This section yields a proposal for the concept of changeability of the cryptographic components.
UNDERLYING IDEAS
The goals of the proposal for changeability of cryptographic components include:
• Exchange should be an automatic procedure, that is, it should not require any assistance from the user.
• The user should not be aware that an exchange has been performed. In order to support exchanging of the cryptographic components we propose an approach that includes the following: • A collection of at least two different cryptographic primitives for each of the required cryptographic functions (hashing, digital signature, encryption), each containing an element that is used by default and a number of optional ones (with at least one optional element) • A collection of the keys for the ciphering and digital signature, each containing at least two different keys • A protocol for updating the collections of cryptographic primitives and keys The underlying ideas for exchangeability include the following:
• The secure downloading scheme assumes that in each time instant at least one element from each collection can be considered a secure component.
• The proposal assumes that a software downloading protocol also supports downloading of cryptographic components.
• The cryptographic primitives and keys involved in the download (related to exchange of cryptographic components) are a particular selection from the available collection. 
MODEL OF EXCHANGE
The model for exchanging components is as follows:
• All cryptographic components employed are considered as elements of an n × 5 matrix where each column corresponds to a collection of n ≥ 2 elements for each of the cryptographic components employed: hashing functions, digital signatures, ciphering algorithms, secret keys, and public keys.
• The first row of the matrix contains the cryptographic components that are used by default.
• Exchanging the cryptographic component is equivalent to updating a matrix entry.
• Selection of a combination of the cryptographic components for updating is a selection of a path in the matrix. Accordingly, more rows yield the opportunity for more choices to select a path that yields the desired level of security. This model is illustrated in Fig. 6 . An illustration of the collection of cryptographic components where each collection contains three elements (which is only one element more than the allowed minimum) is displayed in Table 1 .
PROTOCOL FOR EXCHANGING
The decision to update any of the cryptographic components is the exclusive right of the manufacturer. The update will usually occur during the next request from a terminal for downloading of any program software. The basic procedure for updating is as follows: A particular collection of cryptographic primitives initially implemented in a terminal could include one-time-pad enciphering [8] if this is appropriate from the viewpoint of the manufacturer. More details on the cryptographic primitives SHA, MD5, RSA, ECC, stream, and block ciphers from Table 1 can be found in [8] .
CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a framework for the approval, confidential transmission, and verification of software to be downloaded for a softwaredefined radio system, as well as preventing usage of unapproved or illegally created software.
By using a public/private key scheme for the authentification and verification of software, the regulatory agencies can control the approval of software and/or software/hardware combinations.
Each terminal has software encrypted to it uniquely using a symmetric secret key scheme. The use of symmetric keys means fast processing, and reducing the processing load at the terminal and source. Unique keys guard against the spread of illegal software.
The system is flexible since it is open for implementations with traditional cryptographic techniques as well as novel ones developed specifically for SDR environments and terminals.
The system is based on initial setting of the cryptographic components (by a manufacturer) which can if necessary be exchanged later in an automatic way without any assistance or interaction by the user. Users do not require any kind of password. The initial key generation and distribution are accomplished at manufacture, and updating is possible via secure download, so no key distribution network is required. Responsibility for security of the cryptographic primitives and keys rests mainly with the manufacturer.
The proposed framework overcomes the limi-I Figure 6 . tations imposed by having different security measures for each wireless standard or technique and instead uses an end-to-end encryption scheme to reduce the occasions where an attack against unencrypted data can be made. The proposal yields a number of advantages over previously reported techniques relevant to secure download like SSL and WEP. As an illustration, note that the advantages include:
• Removal of undesirable access by a malicious user to the security components, which is at least possible in SSL, is avoided in the proposed framework by employment of tamper-resistant hardware.
• The potential security problems related to employment of a MAC for a message authentication are overcome by use of digital signature.
• In comparison with WEP encryption problems, the proposed framework assumes secure encryption based on a set of appropriate cryptographic components.
